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Public Law Declarators, the Jurisdiction of the Court, and Scottish 
Independence: Keatings v Advocate General 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Keatings v Advocate General,1 the pursuer sought to appeal the decision of the Lord 
Ordinary (Lady Carmichael) to dismiss his action of declarator.2 The pursuer wanted two 
declarators to confirm that it was within the competence of the Scottish Parliament to 
legislate unilaterally for an independence referendum, and that no provision of the Scottish 
Government’s proposed legislation on the matter fell outside of that competence.3 The Lord 
Ordinary had refused to make these declarators on the grounds that they were “hypothetical, 
academic and premature”.4 
The Inner House, consisting of the Lord President (Lord Carloway), Lord Menzies and Lord 
Doherty, refused the pursuer’s appeal and upheld much of the Lord Ordinary’s original 
decision. In the court’s view, the action was indeed “premature, hypothetical and academic”.5 
However, the Inner House also held that the jurisdiction of the court to grant a declarator on 
the competence of a Bill before Royal Assent was excluded by the Scotland Act 1998, thus 
overturning part of the Lord Ordinary’s decision. Despite refusing the declarators, the Inner 
House also made a series of brief obiter remarks on the legislative competence of the Scottish 
Parliament in authorising a referendum on Scottish independence.    
It is important to consider the constitutional significance of the Inner House’s decision and its 
implications for public law in Scotland. Firstly, the claim will be made that Keatings confirmed 
the existence of a new public law action of declarator which is separate and distinct from 
judicial review. Secondly, it will be argued that the Inner House, in finding that the Scotland 
Act 1998 excludes the jurisdiction of the court to determine the competence of Bills other 
than by the section 33 procedure, identified an additional ground on which to dismiss the 
action in Keatings, but otherwise did not significantly limit the future application of public law 
declarators. Thirdly, it will be shown that the Inner House’s obiter remarks on the ability of 
the Scottish Parliament to legislate for a second independence referendum will help to frame 
and clarify the legal question for any subsequent litigation on the matter. 
B. DECISION 
(1) Public law action of declarator 
Keatings is an important yet unusual public law case because it was brought by the pursuer 
as an ordinary action of declarator rather than as a petition for judicial review. Judicial review 
 
1 [2021] CSIH 25 (hereafter “Keatings IH”). 
2 Keatings v Advocate General for Scotland and the Lord Advocate [2021] CSOH 16 (hereafter “Keatings OH”). 
See also R.B. Taylor, “Preserving the Rule of Law in Public Law Cases: Keatings v Advocate General for Scotland 
and the Lord Advocate” (2021) 25 EdinLR 231. 
3 Keatings OH para 1; Keatings IH para 1. 
4 Keatings OH para 139. 
5 Keatings IH para 55. 
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is the principal mechanism by which public law litigation is brought. However, as per the test 
in West v Secretary of State for Scotland,6 some allegation of unlawful conduct by a public 
body in the exercise of its delegated authority would normally be required in order for the 
supervisory jurisdiction of the court to be engaged. No such unlawful conduct was alleged in 
Keatings. The pursuer instead wanted the courts to confirm the legislative competence of the 
Scottish Parliament in relation to holding a second independence referendum so as to clarify 
the choices facing voters in elections on the issue of Scottish independence.7 As a result, the 
pursuer brought an ordinary action of declarator, something traditionally used only in the 
field of private law. 
In doing so the pursuer relied upon the decision of the Inner House in Wightman v Secretary 
of State for Exiting the European Union,8 specifically the comments made by the Lord 
President (Lord Carloway) therein.9 Wightman concerned a petition for judicial review where 
a declarator on the revocability of Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”) was 
sought. Although no unlawful conduct was alleged in the case, the Inner House nevertheless 
granted the declarator. In so doing, the Lord President seemed to suggest obiter that the 
decision could have been brought instead as an ordinary action of declarator.10  As I have 
argued elsewhere, despite dismissing the pursuer’s action, the Lord Ordinary in Keatings 
nevertheless recognised a new standalone public law action of declarator that is separate and 
distinct from judicial review, thus giving force to the obiter remarks of the Lord President in 
Wightman.11 The Inner House, it is submitted, confirmed this. 
In delivering the opinion of the court, the Lord President stated with approval that the case 
had “proceeded, correctly, as an action rather than a petition for judicial review”.12 On the 
question of when the court would decline an application for a declarator, the Lord President 
reaffirmed his decision in Wightman as follows: 
The principle of access to justice requires that, as a generality, anyone can apply to 
the court to determine what the law is in a given situation. There are limits to this.  
One of them is that, again as a generality, the court will not determine hypothetical or 
academic questions. Those are questions, the answers to which have no practical 
effect.13 
In so doing, the Inner House, like the Lord Ordinary, did not distinguish between actions of 
declarator or petitions for judicial review where a declarator is sought (such as Wightman). It 
 
6 1992 SC 385. 
7 Keatings OH para 45; Keatings IH para 23. 
8 [2018] CSIH 62 (hereafter “Wightman IH”). 
9 See Keatings OH para 52; Keatings IH para 23. 
10 Wightman IH para 26. 
11 Taylor (n 2). 
12 Keatings IH para 70. 
13 Keatings IH para 51. 
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can be reasonably concluded therefore that the requirements for the granting of such a 
declarator remain the same for both.14 
Furthermore, the Inner House held that the test for standing in judicial review – the sufficient 
interest test as stated in AXA General Insurance and others v The Lord Advocate and others15 
– applied equally to actions of declarator on public law matters as it did to petitions for judicial 
review, thus confirming the view of the Lord Ordinary.16 As the Lord President observed: 
Where a bare declarator is sought, it must have a purpose. It must produce a practical 
result.  In so far as this overlaps with title and interest (standing), the result must be 
one of the person seeking the remedy, although it may also affect others. Whether a 
person has a sufficient interest depends upon the context … There is no difference in 
this area between ordinary actions and petitions for judicial reviews where each seeks 
a public law remedy.17 
From the above, it can be clearly seen that the Inner House in Keatings, like the Lord Ordinary 
before it, recognised the existence of two distinct public law actions: (1) the petition for 
judicial review; and (2) a new standalone public law action of declarator. Crucially, both share 
the same rules on standing, the sufficient interest test, with the Inner House also going as far 
as to suggest that the expenses regime between an action of declarator and a petition for 
judicial review, in the interest of access to justice, “ought not to be too different”.18 The 
recognition of this new public law action, although qualified, nevertheless represents a 
notable widening of the public law jurisdiction of the court in Scotland.  Public law litigation 
need no longer dependent solely on judicial review and the allegation of unlawful conduct.  
Keatings is therefore a constitutionally significant decision notwithstanding the fact that the 
pursuer was ultimately unsuccessful. 
Applying the above-mentioned requirements of public law declarators to the facts in 
Keatings,19 the Inner House rejected the pursuer’s argument that a declarator was required 
in order for him to exercise his right to vote.20 The case before them, the Lord President 
observed, “is readily distinguishable from Wightman”.21 In Wightman, MPs had to approve 
any withdrawal agreement under the terms of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. 
Determining the revocability of Article 50 TEU, therefore, “clarified the options which were 
open to MPs in the lead up to what was an inevitable vote on a matter of importance to the 
UK”.22 By contrast, Keatings involved only a draft Bill which, unlike a Bill, “has no legal 
 
14 See Taylor (n 2) 236. 
15 [2011] UKSC 46. 
16 Keatings OH para 116 and 124. 
17 Keatings IH para 53. 
18 Ibid para 70. 
19 Ibid para 53. 
20 Ibid para 54. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
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status”.23 Echoing the view of the Lord Ordinary,24 the Inner House emphasised the 
uncertainty of the situation before them at the time.  It was unclear whether or not a Bill 
authorising an independence referendum would ever be introduced, and if so, to what extent 
it would change during its passage through Parliament.  It was also unclear whether the UK 
Government would refuse to grant an Order in Council under section 30 of the Scotland Act 
1998 (“section 30 Order”) empowering the Scottish Parliament to pass such legislation.25  If a 
Bill was ever passed without a section 30 Order, the Lord President further observed that “it 
is highly probable that the UK Government’s law officers would refer the Bill for scrutiny by 
the UK Supreme Court”.26  It was accordingly on this basis that the Inner House agreed with 
the decision of the Lord Ordinary and held that the declarators sought were “premature, 
hypothetical and academic”, and that “[a] decision by this court on the matters litigated 
would serve no practical purpose”.27 
(2) The Scotland Act 1998 and the jurisdiction of the court 
A key feature of Keatings, and one which distinguished if further from Wightman, was that 
the pursuer sought declarators on the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament. 
However, section 33 of the Scotland Act 1998 already provides a special procedure whereby 
the UK Supreme Court can determine the competence of Bills referred to it by Scottish and 
UK law officers before Royal Assent is received.   
The defenders in Keatings, the Advocate General for Scotland and the Lord Advocate, had 
argued throughout that section 33 was the only mechanism by which the competence of 
proposed legislation could be judicially determined before receiving Royal Assent; the 
jurisdiction of the court was otherwise excluded by the Scotland Act 1998, including the 
granting of declarators.28 However, the Lord Ordinary, relying principally on the decision of 
the UK Supreme Court in AXA, rejected this outright.29 
In AXA, the UK Supreme Court held that judicial review of Acts of the Scottish Parliament was 
not limited only to the terms of section 29 of the Scotland Act 1998, but also included 
common law grounds with the exception of irrationality.30 As Lord Reed famously remarked: 
[T]he Scottish Parliament is not a sovereign parliament in the sense that Westminster 
can be described as sovereign: its powers were conferred by an Act of Parliament, and 
those powers, being defined, are limited. It is the function of the courts to interpret 
and apply those limits, and the Scottish Parliament is therefore subject to the 
jurisdiction of the courts.31 
 
23 Ibid para 55. 
24 Keatings OH paras 103 and 131. 
25 Keatings IH para 55. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Keatings OH paras 16-18, 28-29 and 33; Keatings IH paras 30 and 42. 
29 Keatings OH paras 102-112. 
30 AXA (n 15) paras 45-52 (Lord Hope); paras 135-154 (Lord Reed). 
31 Ibid para 138. 
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Applying AXA by analogy, the Lord Ordinary therefore concluded that section 33 likewise did 
not exclude the jurisdiction of the court.32 Furthermore, although section 40 of the Scotland 
Act 1998 excluded the jurisdiction of the court in specific ways with regards to proceedings 
against the Scottish Parliament, it nevertheless expressly preserved the power of the court to 
make declarators.33 The Scottish Parliament, therefore, “is a creation of statute and remains 
subject to the jurisdiction of the court where that is not the subject of specific exclusion”.34  
However, irrespective of this wide jurisdiction, the Lord Ordinary was keen to stress that 
judicial pronouncement on the competence of a Bill would be a rare occurrence. As she noted: 
[I]t will generally … be premature and pointless for the court to adjudicate as to the 
lawfulness of a proposed act of Parliament at any point before it is passed, because it 
is open to change by way of amendment at the hands of the Parliament itself until it 
has been passed.35 
Furthermore, other remedies existed once legislation was passed, such as before Royal Assent 
under the above-mentioned section 33 procedure or afterwards via judicial review, thus 
negating the need for a declarator beforehand.36 
Therefore, although the courts could make public law declarators on the competence of Bills 
notwithstanding the section 33 procedure, the Lord Ordinary was of the view that courts will 
generally not be able to do so due to Bills being subject to change during their passage 
through Parliament.  In other words, the courts are very likely to refuse a declarator in relation 
to a Bill on the grounds that it is hypothetical, academic and premature. 
Whilst the Inner House acknowledged that the Scottish Parliament was subject to the 
jurisdiction of the court,37 it nevertheless disagreed with the Lord Ordinary that this 
jurisdiction could only be excluded specifically by legislation and thus overturned her decision 
on this point.38 As the Lord President noted, “[e]xclusion can also occur by necessary 
implication and, in that respect, it is a question of the construction of the particular statute in 
each situation”.39 The only occasions where “clear and unambiguous terms” is required in 
order for the jurisdiction of the court to be excluded is in relation to ouster clauses (statutory 
provisions which seek to exclude judicial review) and the interference with fundamental 
human rights.40 
Keatings, in contrast, involved a specific statutory remedy in the form of section 33. As the 
Lord President accordingly observed, “[w]here such a specific statutory remedy is inconsistent 
with the use of an ordinary one, the latter may be held excluded by necessary implication. 
 
32 Keatings OH paras 109-112. 
33 Ibid para 105. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid para 131. See also para 103. 
36 Ibid para 130. 
37 Keatings IH para 57. 
38 Ibid para 58. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid para 59. 
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That is the situation here”.41  In the opinion of the Inner House, therefore, the 1998 Act by 
necessary implication excluded the jurisdiction of the court to grant a declarator on the 
competence of a Bill before Royal Assent. As the Lord President observed: 
The Act goes on to provide expressly for the scrutiny of Bills at a stage after a Bill has 
been passed by the Parliament but prior to it receiving Royal Assent. It has confined 
that scrutiny to the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom and then only on the 
application, within a limited window of time, of the principal law officers of Scotland 
and the United Kingdom (1998 Act, s 33(1)). This is the only method of scrutinising a 
measure for legislative competency prior to Royal Assent.42 
In other words, the Inner House held that the jurisdiction of the court to determine the 
competence of Bills before Royal Assent is excluded by the Scotland Act 1998 other than by 
the section 33 procedure.  It is submitted that the significance of this decision is threefold.  
Firstly, in finding this statutory exclusion, the Inner House also identified an additional ground 
for dismissing the action in Keatings which is necessarily preliminary to the requirements of 
a public law declarator discussed above.  Secondly, although this statutory exclusion does 
limit the application of public law declarators, it does so only narrowly in relation to the 
competence of proposed legislation before Royal Assent; public law declarators otherwise 
remain available where the requirements of the action are satisfied. Consequently, public law 
declarators still have the potential to play a major role in shaping the future of Scottish public 
law.  Thirdly, the Inner House’s recognition of this statutory exclusion made it unequivocally 
clear that the competence of any Bill authorising a referendum on Scottish independence can 
only be determined before Royal Assent via the section 33 procedure.  
 (3) Scottish independence and the competence of the Scottish Parliament 
The pursuer made a wide range of constitutional arguments in support of declarators being 
made to confirm the ability of the Scottish Parliament to legislate unilaterally for an 
independence referendum.43  Despite refusing the pursuer’s appeal on the grounds discussed 
above, the Inner House nevertheless commented briefly on the merits of the pursuer’s 
arguments.  Although strictly obiter, it is submitted that the Lord President’s remarks are 
nevertheless important. 
The Inner House confirmed that, had they decided to answer the questions posed by the 
pursuer, “it would have done so as a matter of straightforward statutory interpretation”.44 As 
a result, the court was of the view that the pursuer’s arguments regarding the distinctiveness 
of the Scottish constitutional tradition relative to that of England’s “would have been of 
peripheral relevance in the exercise”.45 There would therefore be no need to explore the 
continuing relevance of A.V. Dicey’s understanding of parliamentary sovereignty, noting also 
 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid para 60.  See also para 61. 
43 Ibid paras 21-22.  See also Keatings OH paras 58-76. 
44 Ibid para 63. 
45 Ibid para 64.  See also para 65. 
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that “the pursuer’s reports of its demise seem greatly exaggerated”.46  Instead, the relevant 
legal question to be decided would be as follows: 
[W]hether an Act to hold a referendum on Scottish Independence “relates to” 
(s.29(2)(b)) “the Union of the Kingdoms of Scotland and England” or “the Parliament 
of the United Kingdom” (sch 5 part 1 para 1(b) and (c)) having regard to its effect in all 
circumstances (s.29(3)). The Act would relate to these reserved matters if it had “more 
than a loose or consequential connection with them” (UK Withdrawal from the EU 
(Legal Continuity) (Scotland) Bill 2019 SC (UKSC) at para [27], quoting Martin v Most 
2020 SC (UKSC) 40, Lord Walker at para [49]).47 
The Lord President concluded by saying that “[v]iewed in this way, it may not be too difficult 
to arrive at a conclusion, but that is a matter, perhaps, for another day”.48 
Regardless of the level of difficulty, there is little doubt that different conclusions to the 
question posed by the Inner House will be reached.  Although it is clear that that Scottish 
independence itself would fall outside of the legislative competence of the Scottish 
Parliament, it is less clear if the same is true of a referendum on Scottish independence.  
However, what is clear is that the answer to this question will turn only on the nature of the 
connection between a referendum on Scottish independence and the Union between England 
and Scotland or the Westminster Parliament; anything else is irrelevant.  These obiter remarks 
are therefore very significant in framing and clarifying the relevant legal question to be 
answered, and thus will help to set the stage for the matter to be decided in any future 
litigation – should the need ever arise. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Although the pursuer was ultimately unsuccessful in seeking an answer to the constitutional 
questions he posed, Keatings is nevertheless a landmark decision in the development of 
public law in Scotland.  It clarified the law following Wightman in recognising a new 
standalone public law action of declarator that exists alongside judicial review.  Although the 
Inner House held that the Scotland Act 1998 excluded public law declarators on the 
competence of Bills before Royal Assent altogether, this does not significantly limit the use of 
such declarators moving forward.  In so doing, the court also made it clear that, should a Bill 
ever be passed authorising a second independence referendum, questions as to its 
competence before Royal Assent can only be determined through the section 33 procedure.  
Furthermore, should this procedure ever be invoked, the court’s obiter remarks will no doubt 
prove useful to the UK Supreme Court in making its decision.  Whether this will ever happen, 
however, remains to be seen. 
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